

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 223226

62

ORIGIN PM-03

INFO OCT-01 EUR-10 ISO-00 ACDA-10 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-03 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-01

OMB-01 PA-01 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-14 TRSE-00

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S/S:JMEALUM

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O P 092347Z OCT 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE
INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA PRIORITY
ALL NATO CAPITALS

S E C R E T STATE 223226

E.O. 11652:GDS
TAGS:PARM, NATO
SUBJECT: MBFR INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS

REF: STATE 211141

1. YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE US WISHES TO INCLUDE
AIR MANPOWER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE WE BELIEVE IT
CAN BE USED AS ONE METHOD OF HELPING TO ACHIEVE BASIC
ALLIED OBJECTIVES. WE BELIEVE THE ALLIES NEED TO BOLSTER
THEIR EFFORTS TO REACH THEIR COMMON CEILING GOAL WITH
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 223226

NEGOTIATING PROBES WHICH WOULD LEAD THE EAST IN THIS

DIRECTION. AT THE SAME TIME, WE WOULD BE RETAINING THE FOCUS ON PACT GROUND SUPERIORITY AND NOT PREJUDICING STEEP ASYMMETRICAL CUTS OF THESE FORCES. THE SOVIETS HAVE CONTINUALLY RETURNED TO THE THEME THAT AIR FORCES MUST BE INCLUDED, AND WE BELIEVE THEIR INTEREST CAN BE USEFULLY PROBED.

2. AS SPELLED OUT IN MORE DETAIL BELOW, WE BELIEVE THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD TEST THE EAST IN VIENNA ON THE AIR MANPOWER ISSUE ALONG LINES PROPOSED BY USDEL MBFR, WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY STUDYING VARIOUS POSSIBLE WAYS OF INCLUDING AIR MANPOWER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. DEPENDING ON THE RESULTS OF THE VIENNA PROBE, THE ALLIES WOULD THEN BE IN A POSITION TO DECIDE WHAT FURTHER ACTION SHOULD BE PURSUED.

3. THE TEST WE HAVE IN MIND IS BASED ON THE NAC GUIDANCE TO THE AHG APPROVED ON OCTOBER 2 AND RELATED GUIDANCE THAT MAY BE FORTHCOMING. THE PROBE WOULD PROCEED AS FOLLOWS:

(A) INITIALLY THE ALLIES WOULD EXPLORE THE DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES ISSUE WITH THE EAST;

(B) IF EASTERN INTEREST IN AIR REDUCTIONS WAS EXPRESSED AGAIN, THE ALLIES WOULD THEN POINT OUT THE APPROXIMATE EQUALITY IN AIR MANPOWER ON BOTH SIDES. THUS ITS ADDITION TO THE REDUCTION BASE WOULD NOT CHANGE THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

4. SINCE THESE TWO PROBES HAVE AS THEIR OBJECTIVE RETAINING A GROUND FORCE FOCUS, THEIR RESULTS SHOULD GIVE THE ALLIES A BETTER FEELING FOR HOW THE EAST VIEWS AIR MANPOWER. THE PROBE COULD BE FURTHERED BY EXPLORING THE AIR ISSUE, SHORT OF AIR REDUCTIONS. BUT MOVES IN THIS DIRECTION WOULD ONLY BE UNDERTAKEN AFTER APPROPRIATE ALLIED MILITARY-TECHNICAL STUDIES HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN.

5. AS PART OF AIR MANPOWER PROBE, AN EXPLORATION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING AIR MANPOWER IN THE NO-INCREASE BETWEEN PHASES COMMITMENT WOULD SEEM APPROPRIATE. BEFORE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 223226

MOVING TOWARD THIS, EACH ALLY WILL WANT TO CONSIDER FUTURE PLANS FOR ITS AIR FORCES AND HOW A FREEZE MIGHT AFFECT THEM. THE RESULTS OF THESE REVIEWS WILL HELP DETERMINE HOW THE ALLIES WISH TO REVISE THEIR CURRENT NO-INCREASE PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE AIR MANPOWER.

6. THUS, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS WOULD NOT PROCEED FURTHER ON THIS TACK UNLESS THE EAST, AFTER TESTING, DEMONSTRATES

REAL INTEREST WHICH WOULD BE APPLIED TOWARD ACCEPTANCE OF ALLIED NEGOTIATING GOALS.

7. IF THE EAST CONTINUES TO EVIDENCE A REAL INTEREST IN AIR MANPOWER, BROADENING THE SCOPE OF THE COMMON CEILING TO INCLUDE AIR MANPOWER WOULD INCREASE THE LOGIC OF THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AND THE FORCE OF WESTERN ARGUMENTS ON ITS BEHALF. THE INCLUSION WOULD FORCE THE EAST TO ARGUE AGAINST PARITY ITSELF, AND ABANDON ARGUMENTS BASED ON THE ALLEGATION THAT THE ALLIES HAVE CONTRIVED THE SEPARATION OF GROUND FORCES IN ORDER TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. ALSO, INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN US AND SOVIET PHASE I REDUCTIONS COULD BE CONSIDERED.

8. WHILE PROBES ARE TAKING PLACE, NATO WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITIES FOR INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER

IN THE ALLIED POSITION. TO THIS END, WE EXPECT TO PROVIDE NATO A STUDY OF ILLUSTRATIVE OPTIONS BY THE END OF NEXT WEEK.

9. BEGIN FYI. WE BELIEVE THAT THE COMBINATION OF A CAREFULLY PLANNED PROBE PLUS THE OPPORTUNITY TO UNDERTAKE THE NECESSARY STUDIES WILL REASSURE THE ALLIES, SINCE IT WILL BE ONLY AFTER THESE HAVE BEEN COMPLETED THAT THE ALLIES WILL DECIDE HOW TO PROCEED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY WILL NOT BE PRECOMMITTED TO A SPECIFIC LINE. YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE YOUR STRATEGY TO WORK THE ADDITION OF AIR MANPOWER TO THE NO-INCREASE ASSURANCE IN THE SPC, WITHOUT THE NECESSITY OF FURTHER WORKING GROUP STUDIES. IF YOUR STRATEGY IS SUCCESSFUL, THE NO-INCREASE ASSURANCE COULD BE DIRECTLY INCORPORATED AS A PART OF THE PROBE. IF NOT, IT COULD BE INCLUDED AS AMONG NATO

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 223226

AIR MANPOWER STUDIES TO BE UNDERTAKEN. WE BELIEVE THAT STUDIES NEEDED AS A BASIS FOR A NATO DECISION ON EXPANSION OF THE NO-INCREASE ASSURANCE SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO FACILITATE AND NOT INTERFERE WITH EARLY DECISION ON ITS USE, SINCE WE BELIEVE THAT STUDIES RELATING TO THE ADDITION OF AIR MANPOWER TO THE NO-INCREASE ASSURANCE ARE OF A DIFFERENT ORDER THAN THOSE REQUIRED FOR CEILINGS AND REDUCTIONS. WHATEVER THE HANDLING OF THE NO-INCREASE ISSUE, WE HOPE THAT THE NO-INCREASE CAN BE USED AS PART OF THE PROBE, SO WOULD WISH TO HAVE ANY STUDIES RELATED TO THIS SUBJECT GIVEN PRIORITY. YOU SHOULD TRY TO PREVENT NATO FROM UNDERTAKING OTHER STUDIES PRIOR TO THE US SUBMISSION, INDICATED IN PARA 8 ABOVE.

10. WE LEAVE IT TO YOUR JUDGMENT HOW BEST TO ACCOMPLISH
THIS PROGRAM, DRAWING ON THE RATIONALE AS NEEDED. END FYI.
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